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NOTES AND COMMENTS
reasonableness. If such a result is desired, it should be left to the
legislature.
If North Carolina does not allow a riparian owner to use riparian
water on non-riparian land, then it probably will not allow the riparian
owner to convey such a right that he does not have.
JAMEs A. ALSPAUGH.
Torts-Breach of Contractual Duty as Negligence
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently affirmed a ruling
of the superior court striking portions of a complaint relating to a con-
tract between the defendants and a third party as irrelevant to the issue
of actionable negligence.' The complaint charged the defendants with
negligence in performance of their plumbing contract with the Board of
Education of Mecklenburg County, with which the plaintiff had a con-
tract for the general construction work in the erection of a new school
building, the same building for which the defendants were to do the
plumbing. The plaintiff's cause of action was that defendants performed
their contract negligently, resulting in broken water lines which flooded
the foundations of the building, causing large sections of the walls and
underpinning erected by the plaintiff to cave in and break off, and there-
by necessitating their repair by the plaintiff.
Upon motion by defendants, allegations in the complaint referring to
many sections of the plumbing contract were striken by the trial court.
The plaintiff's appeal challenged the striking of these allegations. In
affirming this ruling, the Court recognized that in an action for negli-
gence it is competent to allege and prove the existence of a contract for
the purpose of showing the relationship of the parties out of which
arises the common law duty to use ordinary care, but held that it is not
competent to allege specific terms of the contract as a standard for
measuring the defendant's conduct.2
There is a liberal doctrine in North Carolina whereby an injured
plaintiff may sue in tort for damages caused by the defendant's breach
of a contract, even though the plaintiff is not a party thereto.3 The
plaintiff was allowed to sue for breach of contract as a third party bene-
ficiary in the case of Gorrell v. Water Supply Co.,4 where the complaint
alleged a contract between the defendant, the Greensboro Water Supply
Co., and the City of Greensboro for furnishing the city with water for
1 Pinnix v. Toomey, 242 N. C. 358, 87 S. E. 2d 893 (1955).2 Id. at 363, 87 S. E. 2d at 898.
' Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896); Bond & Willis v.
Hilton, 44 N. C. 308 (1853); Robinson v. Threadgill, 35 N. C. 39 (1851).
'124 N. C. 328, 32 S. E. 720 (1899). See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home
Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 220 (1912) ; Guardian Trust Co. v. Fisher, 200 U. S.
57 (1905).
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the use of its citizens and with sufficient force at all times to protect the
inhabitants of the city against loss by fire. Further allegations were
that a fire was started in a building some thirty feet from the plaintiff's
storeroom; that the fire company was prompt in answering the alarm,
and could easily have extinguished the fire in time to save the plain-
tiff's property, but was unable to do so for the reason that the defendant
did not supply water with sufficient pressure as it had agreed to do in
the contract. A demurrer to this complaint on the ground that the
plaintiff was neither a party nor privity to the contract was overruled,
and this was upheld on appeal. The court observed that the object of the
contract was the benefit and comfort of the citizens of Greensboro, in
comparison to which the benefit of the city, the nominal contracting
party, would be small and would not justify the grants, concessions,
privileges, benefits and payments made to the defendant. It was fur-
ther reasoned that the protection of private as well as public property
was in the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and therefore
the plaintiff could maintain an action for its breach. The Court ad-
mitted that the majority of decisions in point up to that time had been
decided contra, but declared that it should adopt "that line (of reasoning)
which is most consonant with justice and the 'reason of the thing.' "
Two years later, upon substantially the same facts, the question was
squarely raised whether the injured party should recover in tort or in
contract.' The jury found that the defendant had breached its contract
with the city and that the plaintiff had been injured by the negligence
of the defendant. The trial court entered judgment for damage as upon
breach of contract, to which the plaintiff excepted and appealed, claim-
ing that under section 1255 of The Code,7 an execution issued upon a
judgment founded on an action of tort has superior advantages in its en-
forcement over an execution issued upon a judgment founded upon con-
tract. Although this contention of the plaintiff was not passed upon,
the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for
damage done him by the negligence of the defendant, as prayed for,
since the plaintiff had stated facts out of which arose an obligation, its
breach by the defendant, and the resulting damage to the plaintiff.8 Later
North Carolina cases have strongly affirmed this position.9
Id. at 335, 32 S. E. at 722.
' Fisher v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 128 N. C. 375, 38 S. E. 912 (1901).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-44 (1950), which provides: "Mortgages, deeds of trust
or other conveyances upon condition of public service corporations upon their
property or earnings cannot exempt said property or earnings from execution for
the satisfaction of any judgment obtained in the courts of the State against such
corporations for labor and clerical services performed, or torts committed whereby
any person is killed or any person or property injured."
128 N. C. at 378-79, 38 S. E. at 914.
o Brown v. Bowers Construction Co., 236 N. C. 462, 73 S. E. 2d 147 (1952);
Canestrine v. Powell, 231 N. C. 190, 56 S. E. 2d 566 (1949); Powell v. Wake
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Another instance of breach of contract in which a party to the
contract is liable in tort to one not a party thereto may be found in the
telegraph "mental anguish" cases, where the addressee seeks to recover
from the telegraph 'company for its negligent failure to properly transmit
and deliver a message. North Carolina allows recovery upon this basis
in the case of intrastate messages ;1o however, where interstate messages
are involved, the federal rule governs, and no recovery is allowed for
mental anguish.1
A telegraph company is a quasi public corporation, and, as such, the
law implies duties upon it for the benefit of the public.' 2 It is required
to receive, and promptly transmit and deliver with reasonable care all
messages tendered in good faith.' 4
Thus we see the recognition of the availability of a tort action in
cases of breach of contract. This provides persons who would usually
have no standing to recover on the contract itself with a means of re-
coupment for damage caused to them by the defendant's conduct.
But this recognition may be important to persons who are parties
to the contract as well as to those who are not. An illustration of this
Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426 (1916) ; Morton v. Washington Light
and Water Co., 168 N. C. 582, 84 S. E. 1019 (1915); Orinoco Supply Co. v.
Shaw Brothers Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 428, 76 S. E. 273 (1912) ; Helms v. Tele-
graph Co., 143 N. C. 386, 55 S. E. 831 (1906); Jones v. Water Co., 135 N. C.
553, 47 S. E. 615 (1904); Gastonia v. McEntee-Peterson Engineering Co., 131
N. C. 363, 42 S. E. 858 (1902).
" Russ v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 222 N. C. 504, 23 S. E. 2d 681
(1942); Gibbs v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 196 N. C. 516, 146 S. E. 209
(1928); Waters v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 194 N. C. 188, 138 S. E. 608
(1927); LeHue v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 174 N. C. 332, 93 S. E. 843
(1917); Smith v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 168 N. C. 515, 84 S. E. 796
(1915).
" Ward v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 226 N. C. 175, 37 S. E. 2d 123
(1946); Gibbs v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 196 N. C. 516, 146 S. E. 209
(1928); Johnson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 175 N. C. 588, 96 S. E. 36
(1918); Askew v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 174 N. C. 261, 93 S. E. 773
(1917); Norris v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 174 N. C. 92, 93 S. E. 465
(1917). In the first case in which recovery was allowed in North Carolina, the
Court said that the action was in reality in the nature of tort for negligence, and
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover compensation for actual damage done
him, and that mental anguish was actual damage. Young v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E. 1044 (1890).
"Green v. Telegraph Co., 136 N. C. 489, 49 S. E. 165 (1904); Cashion v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 124 N. C. 459, 32 S. E. 746 (1899).
x' Barnes v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 156 N. C. 150, 72 S. E. 78 (1911).
' Cordell v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 149 N. C. 402, 63 S. E. 71 (1908);
Cogdell v. Telegraph Co., 135 N. C. 431, 47 S. E. 490 (1904).
In order for a plaintiff to recover for mental anguish caused by failure or delay
in delivery, it is essential that it be shown that the telegraph company had knowl-
edge of the urgency and importance of the message. Powell v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 191 N. C. 356, 131 S. E. 762 (1926); LeHue v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 175 N. C. 561, 96 S. E. 29 (1918); Holler v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 149 N. C. 336, 63 S. E. 92 (1908) ; Suttle v. Western Union Telegraph
Co, 148 N. C. 480, 62 S. E. 593 (1908) ; Darlington v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 127 N. C. 448, 37 S. E. 479 (1900).
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may be found in the common carrier field, which furnishes a widely liti-
gated instance of breach of contract giving rise to an action in tort. It
would seem that the availability of a tort action would prove highly
beneficial when we consider that because of their public character, com-
mon carriers have been held to the highest degree of care.
When a common carrier takes into its possession goods for trans-
portation, the law imposes upon the carrier the duty 1) to transport the
goods safely, and 2) to deliver them within a reasonable time.'5 There-
fore, upon showing delivery of the goods to the carrier in good condition,
and their delivery to the consignee in bad condition, the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the carrier.'0
Herein lies one advantage of a tort action in such cases.
The obligations that are assumed by a carrier as to passengers are
to transport them safely and reasonably swiftly to their destination.
Again, if these obligations are breached by the negligence of the car-
rier, the injured party may sue for breach of contract, or may sue in
tort. Here, too, the passenger is aided in a tort action against the car-
rier for injuries caused by the negligence of the carrier in that, upon
a showing that the injury was received without fault on the part of the
plaintiff, in consequence of the breaking or failure of the vehicle, road-
way, or other appliances owned or controlled by the carrier in making
the transit, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, which the car-
rier must rebut.
17
In making a choice of remedies, another major factor is the question
of damages. Generally, an action in tort will prove more advantageous
in this respect, as it will permit a greater recovery. Damages recover-
able in an action for breach of contract are usually such as may reason-
" Holmes v. East Carolina R. R., 186 N. C. 58, 118 S. E. 887 (1923) ; Bivens
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 176 N. C. 414, 97 S. E. 215 (1918) ; Forrester V.
Southern R. R. Co., 147 N. C. 553, 61 S. E. 524 (1908).
At common law, in the absence of a special contract, the liability of a common
carrier for the loss of or injury to property is practically that of an insurer, ex-
ceptions being damage or loss caused by an act of God, acts of the public enemy,
negligence of the .shipper, and the inherent nature of the goods. American Cig-
arette and Cigar Co. v. Garner, 229 N. C. 173, 47 S. E. 2d 854 (1948) ; Merchant
v. Lassiter, 224 N. C. 343, 30 S. E. 2d 217 (1944) ; Moore v. Southern R. R. Co.,
183 N. C. 213, 111 S. E. 166 (1922); Morris v. American Ry. Express Co., 183
N. C. 144, 110 S. E. 855 (1922); Perry v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 171 N. C.
158, 88 S. E. 156 (1916) ; Harrell v. Owens, 18 N. C. 273 (1835).
" Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U. S. 416 (1926);
Precythe v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 230 N. C. 195, 52 S. E. 2d 360 (1949) ;
Fuller v. Virginia and Carolina Southern R. R. Co., 214 N. C. 648, 200 S. E. 402
(1938); Edgerton v. Southern R. R. Co., 203 N. C. 281, 165 S. E. 689 (1932);
Moore v. Southern R. R. Co., 183 N. C. 213, 111 S. E. 166 (1922); Bivens v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 176 N. C. 414, 97 S. E. 215 (1918); Mitchell v.
Carolina- Central R. R. Co., 124 N. C. 236, 32 S. E. 671 (1899).
"Humphries v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N. C. 399, 45 S. E. 2d 546 (1947);
Lindsey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 173 N. C. 390, 92 S E. 166 (1917);
McCord v. Atlanta & C. Air Line R. R. Co., 134 N. C. 53, 45 S. E. 1031 (1903);
Lambeth v. North Carolina R. R. Co., 66 N. C. 494 (1872).
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ably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties when
the contract was made,18 whereas in an action of personal injury result-
ing from the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
the present worth of all damages sustained in consequence of the defend-
ant's tort.' 9 In proper cases it is possible to recover punitive damages20
and damages for mental suffering 21 in tort actions, while they are not
usually allowed in actions for breach of contract.22
Many attempts have been made to define the areas of tort liability
and liability upon contract, one of the most common of which is upon
the basis of misfeasance and nonfeasance, the acting negligently and the
complete failure to act. However, the line between the two is sometimes
difficult to draw, as in some instances there may be tort liability in cases
of nonfeasance. In these cases there is a duty to act, independent of the
contract; thus a carrier is bound to furnish transportation facilities for
freight; 23 a telegraph company is bound to receive and transmit mes-
sages tendered in good faith ;24 and an innkeeper is bound to provide
suitable accomodations for his guests. 25
Although the writs have been swept away, and there is now only
one form of civil action,20 some of their difficulties of application still
remain. Perhaps it was well said that "when the ghosts of case and
assumpsit walk hand in hand at midnight, it is sometimes a convenient
and comforting thing to have a borderland in which they may lose them-
selves." 27
JOHN D. ELLER, JR.
18 Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N. C. 159, 74 S. E. 2d 634 (1953) ; Lamm v. Shingle-
ton, 231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E. 2d 810 (1949); Meier v. Miller, 229 N. C. 243, 49
S. E. 2d 396 (1948) ; Price v. Goodman, 226 N. C. 223, 37 S. E. 2d 592 (1946) ;
Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N. C. 406, 35 S. E. 2d 277 (1945) ; Chesson v. Keick-
heifer Container Co., 216 N. C. 337, 4 S. E. 2d 886 (1939).
"Mintz v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 233 N. C. 607, 65 S. E. 2d 120(1951) ; Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. 2d 611 (1944) ;
Lane v. Southern R. R. Co., 192 N. C. 287, 134 S. E. 855 (1926); Ledford v.
Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 614, 112 S. E. 421 (1922).
"8 Horton v. Carolina Coach Co., 216 N. C. 567, 5 S. E. 2d 828 (1939) ; Purcell
v. Richmond and Danville R. R. Co., 108 N. C. 414, 12 S. E. 954 (1891).
21 Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Products Corp., 212 N. C. 211, 193 S. E. 31(1937) ; Muse v. Ford Motor Co., 175 N. C. 466, 95 S. E. 900 (1918) ; Bailey v.
Long, 172 N. C. 661, 90 S. E. 809 (1916); Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co., 157 N. C. 21, 72 S. E. 619 (1911); Britt v. Carolina
Northern R. R. Co., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S. E. 601 (1908); Kimberly v. Howland,
143 N. C. 398, 55 S. E. 778 (1906) ; Bowers v. Telegraph Co., 135 N. C. 504, 47
S. E. 597 (1904).
22 Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236 N. C. 723, 73 S. E. 2d 785 (1952) ; Lamm
v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E. 2d 810 (1949).2 N. C. GEx. STAT. § 60-111 (1950).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-371 (1953).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 72-1 (1950).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-9 (1953).
7 PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 452 (1954).
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